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IF YOU CAN'T SAY IT, WHY CAN 
YOU SHOW IT? AN OPEN 
LETTER TO THE FCC 
Federal Communications Commission 
Broadcast Bureau 
Washington, D.C. 
To the Commissioners:1 
By Wendy P. Rouder* 
I am writing as a citizen viewer raising a strong objection to 
the advertising campaign pursued by the CBS network to publi-
* Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. Originally this "open letter" was to be an inquiry into the limits of the Federal 
Communications Commission's censorship powers and the possible effect of these powers 
on controlling television portrayals of undesirable stereotypes. Legal discussion of this 
question has been limited. The few challenges to the broadcast media in this area have 
relied on the fairness doctrine. The fairness doctrine, first articulated by the FCC in 
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensee, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949), requires that the licensee 
provide the public with a "reasonably balanced presentation of all responsible viewpoints" 
in a "discussion of public issues of interest in the community." [d. at 1258. Two leading 
cases-National Organization for Women v. F.C.C., 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and 
Polish American Congress v. F.C.C., 520 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1975), used the fairness 
doctrine to attack stereotyping. In NOW the complained·of images appeared integral to 
the programming of two ABC stations and in the case of Polish the stereotype was said to 
have been presented in a single NBC broadcast. In both cases the FCC refused to fmd a 
violation of the fairness doctrine. At the heart of the appellate affirmation of these FCC 
decisions was the conclusion that Poles are not controversial issues of public importance, 
520 F.2d at 1255·56, and that the overall programming of ABC did not leave "the public 
uninformed on the present issue of women's role in society." 555 F.2d at 1015. 
At the time these decisions were made, the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 326 
(1971), served as support for the decision of the Commission to take a "hands·off policy" 
in terms of regulating program content, except in a few select instances. 
The surface failure of these special interest groups to progress in a fight against 
deleterious stereotyping has been, in part, .factual. They had not found the right set of 
facts and the right legal theory to challenge adequately and demand meaningful appellate 
definition of § 326 of the Communications Act. 
In NO W. the challenge was too broad: it went to the entire programming of two ABC 
stations. For NOW to have prevailed on a content theory would have meant that the FCC 
would have had to engage in broad censorship. In Polish the attacked station and the 
program producer were conciliatory, which weakened the complainant's argument. 
617 
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cize its showing of a motion picture entitled "Lifeguard." The 
motion picture itself was broadcast locally (San Francisco), and 
I assume nationally, on Wednesday, October 11, 1978, at 9:00 
p.m. local time. The advertising campaign for this show was done 
intensely in the week preceding the showing. The promotion con-
sisted of repeated showings of a ten or fifteen second "clip," os-
tensibly from the film. The focus of this clip, the content of which 
is the basis of this complaint, was on several shots of two or three 
briefly clad young women with very large breasts. I personally 
endured three or four such showings of this same clip at various 
times throughout the week preceding the actual broadcast of the 
film. 
In essence, I contend that this repeated showing of "tits"2 
was indecent under federal statute3 and within the meaning of the 
FCC decision in Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Founda-
tion Station WBAl (FM),4 (hereinafter referred to as WBAl). Fur-
2. The words "tits" and "breasts" are used throughout this letter. They are not 
meant synonomously. The writer is aware that the former conveys an offensiveness which 
strikes not only feminists. The term "tit" is meant herein to signify the female breast as 
it is sexually (or commercially) exploited. 
Personal regard for the first amendment aside, and recognizing that Pacifica is now 
the law of the land, this writer would like to see it used to attack what many women and 
men find much more "offensive" and "undesirable" content than Carlin's "dirty" words. 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1971) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 
4. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The "seven dirty words case" invited a test of the parame-
ters of 47 U.S.C. § 326, the Communications Act prohibition of prior censorship. For the 
text of § 326, see note 7, infra. Specifically, the facts were narrow: the radio broadcast 
complained of by one listener, who heard it when his young son was present, was a 
monologue containing seven so-called "dirty words" repeated several times in several 
contexts which were usually sarcastic, ironic, and absurd. 56 F.C.C.2d at 100-0l. 
There was an element in the test of censorship under WBAI, that NOW and Polish 
lacked; namely, a statutory provision giving regulatory and punitive power to the FCC 
with regard to obscene, indecent, or profane language used on the air. 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 
Thus, armed with a narrow set of facts and a statutory axe, the FCC was prepared to flail 
away at WBAl in spite of the prohibitions in 47 U.S.C. § 326. The Commission's WBAI 
decision alluded to a subordination of the free speech interests found in 47 U.S.C. § 326 
to the censorship authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1464: 
At the outset we recognize that Congress in Section 326 of the 
Communications Act prohibited the Commission from engag-
ing in censorship or interfering "with the right of free speech 
by means of radio communications." But the prohibition 
against the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane lan-
guage" was originally included in Section 326. Later it was 
transferred to the criminal code, 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 
56 F.C.C.2d at 96. Construing § 326 as the residue of § 1464, the Commission then 
prpceeded to censure WBAl for its broadcast of indecent language at hours when "children 
Women's Law Forum 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol9/iss2/10
1978-1979] FCC OPEN LETTER 619 
ther, the promotion was indecent within the meaning of the 
United States Supreme Court's affirmation of your WBAI deci-
sion in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (hereinafter referred to as 
Pacifica}. 5 I realize that the effect of your decision was an adjudi-
cation and should not be viewed as the promulgation of a rule.6 I 
am asking for a similar adjudication in the matter of the CBS 
promotion, recalling that in Pacifica the Supreme Court said that 
"the subsequent review of program content is not the sort of 
censorship at which the statute7 was directed."8 
Specifically, I am suggesting that you determine that CBS' 
advertising for "Lifeguard" by use of the complained-of film clip 
was a violation of the federal statute prohibiting the broadcast of 
obscene, indecent or profane language.9 I am aware that this sec-
are undoubtedly in the audience." 
The FCC strained in WBAl to define the language which it considered indecent: 
words which depict "sexual or excretory activities and organs" when children are in the 
audience, in a manner that is "patently offensive by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium." 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission, in formulating its stan-
dard, borrowed from the obscenity criteria found in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 
(1973), but admitted that the criterion of appeal of the material to a listener's prurient 
interests was absent from the WBAI broadcast. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission made 
short shrift of the Miller consideration of whether "the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." 413 U.S. 15, 34. Miller requires the 
absence of this value before a work can be labeled obscene. ld. at 24. The Commission 
wrote that "when children may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed by a claim that 
it has literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. 
The weight of the Commission's decision rested on the presence of children in the 
listening audience, although the Commission also proffered such other grounds for the 
prohibition as the privacy interest in the home, the prospect of unconsenting adult listen-
ers, and the scarcity of spectrum space. 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. Conspicuously absent from the 
Commission's decision was any in-depth consideration of first amendment issues. Also 
missing was an objective basis for the Commission's conclusion that the language as 
broadcast was patently offensive by contemporary community standards. 
5. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
6. ld. at 734. 
7. Section 326 of the Communications Act of 1934 provides: 
Nothing in [the Act] shall be understood or construed to give 
the Commission the power of censorship over the radio commu-
nications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no 
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fIXed by the 
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech 
by means of radio communication. 
8. 438 U.S. at 737. 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1464. For text of § 1464, see note 3 supra. Section 1464 had its origin 
in the Communications Act of 1934. It was removed to Title 18 of the United States Code 
in 1948. The authority for the FCC to enforce § 1464 is found in 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(E) 
(1971). 
Prior to WBAl there had been only four cases discussing § 1464 and those focused on 
the provision as it relates to criminal prosecution: United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 
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tion addresses itself to utterances of language on radio, but for 
several reasons I believe that visual imagery on television falls 
within the meaning of the statute. 
First, television, by statute, comes within the meaning of 
"radio,"lo and "pictures" are a part of "radio communication."11 
Second, pictures or visual imagery in motion picture form are 
entitled to first amendment protection,12 and first amendment 
protection applies to the ·broadcast media.13 Therefore, of neces-
sity, such protection would extend to the visual images shown on 
television. Third, it is settled law that certain categories of speech 
generally are not protected by the first amendment, and the stat-
ute itself specifically permits some categories of speech to be 
treated differently from strictly· protected speech. 
It follows, then, that broadcast pictorial images falling into 
the same prohibited categories as certain verbal utterances under 
the statute would be treated with the same reduced degree of 
protection afforded such verbal speech. To treat such video im-
ages otherwise would lead to the anomalous result, for example, 
that a vernacular utterance describing fornication would be pro-
hibited on the air but a graphic enactment of copulation could 
be televised. 
There is a second reason for my urging that control of visual 
images falls under the authority of the indecency statute. One 
must recall that the statutory language was first enacted as part 
of the Radio Act of 1927.14 The wording of the 1927 Act spoke to 
"radio," "utters," and "language" and did not contain such par-
allel wording for television, probably because in 1927 public ac-
cess to television was a dream and a will away.15 By 1948, televi-
sion was treated as analogous to radio under the terms of the 
Communications Act of 1934.16 It would have been redundant, 
confusing and unnecessary for Congress to have added words such 
(7th Cir. 1972); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972); Gagliardo v. 
United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966), and Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 
(9th Cir. 1931). 
10. 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1971). 
11. [d. 
12. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
13. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). 
14. 44 Stat. 1172·73 (1927). 
15. The first "talking" motion picture, "The Jazz Singer," opened in 1927. 
16. 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1971). 
Women's Law Forum 
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as "depicts," "images" and "television" to the already existing 
"utters," "language" and "radio." 
I appreciate that the Supreme Court's affirmation of your 
WBAI decision was narrowI7 and that the Court conditioned its 
approval of your order on the specific factual context. IS I think 
there is a sufficient similarity between the facts of the CBS adver-
tising broadcast and the facts of the WBAI broadcast to conclude 
that CBS' advertisements were indecent as broadcast. 
My information and belief is that CBS showed its advertising 
clips both during daytime and early evening hours. I9 If I recall 
correctly, one of the times the clip was shown was on a Sunday 
afternoon during a break in a sports broadcast. Since the shots 
were shown during hours when children were likely to be in the 
audience, a consideration of the advertisement's literary or artis-
tic content cannot serve to redeem it.20 Although each showing of 
the advertisement was much briefer than the Carlin monologue 
which formed the basis of the complaint in WBAI-seconds com-
pared to Carlin's minutes-the cumulative effect of repeated 
showings of the ad was that it consumed airtime comparable to 
that consumed by the once-only broadcast of the Carlin mono-
logue. This repetitious effect was even further intensified by the 
fact that each clip contained several large-breasted, scantily clad 
women. Seen in totality these advertisements were not the visual 
equivalent of an "occasional expletive in [an Elizabethan] set-
ting," such as the Supreme Court would find tolerable.21 
Before I address the question of why I believe that these clips 
were the equivalent of repeated, aired usage of the words "tit" 
and "cunt," I wish to acknowledge a distinction. Admittedly, 
Carlin's monologue did not repeatedly use the words "tit" and 
"cunt," but rather the words "shit" and "fuck," although "tit" 
and "cunt" were included in his list of seven forbidden words. 22 
However, I rely on the absence in the Commission's WBAI deci-
17. 438 U.S. at 750. 
18. Id. at 744. 
19. CBS (KPIX) has not responded to the writer's request for the station log for Oct. 
4-11, 1978. 
20. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. 
21. 438 U.S. at 750. 
22. Id. The Court appended the full text of Carlin's monologue. Id. The original seven 
words forbidden on the air were said by Carlin to be shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, 
motherfucker, and tits. Id. 
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sion of analysis of the context in which Carlin used any particular 
word.23 Further, the value of his speech as a whole was not given 
any particular weight other than an acknowledgment of the fact 
that it did not appeal to prurient interests.24 The emphasis in the 
Commission's decision was upon the effect on children hearing a 
"description of sexual or excretory activities and organs" having 
the effect of "debasing and brutalizing human beings by reducing 
them to their mere bodily functions. . . . "25 I hope the Commis-
sion will concede that Carlin's monologue would not have been 
redeemed had he substituted ten mentions of "tit" for ten men-
tions of "shit." In other words, it seems that it was the associative 
value of the words that Carlin used and not the fact that "fuck" 
is more d~basing than "tit" that led the Commission to conclude 
that the monologue was indecent. The factual contexts of the two 
broadcasts have striking similarities, but the more difficult ques-
tion, of course, is analyzing the factual distinctions under the law. 
To measure the facts in the WBAl case, the Commission 
borrowed from and applied some of the tests in Miller v. 
California,28 concluding that the WBAl broadcast was not 
obscene but indecent. 27 The content of the CBS ads in some ways 
more closely meets the obscenity tests of Miller than does that of 
the Carlin monologue: specifically, the CBS clips "taken as a 
whole, appeal to the prurient interest" and "lack serious literary, 
23. As Judge Bazelon noted in his concurrence when the WBAI case reached the 
Court of Appeals: 
The Commission never solicited a jury verdict or expert testi-
mony. Nor did it rely on polls or letters of complaint [other 
than the letter which prompted the Commission's decision]. 
The Commission simply recorded its conclusion that the words 
were indecent, thereby creating the suspicion that its national 
standard is in fact either the composite of the individual Com-
missioner's standards or what they suppose are national stan-
dards. 
556 F.2d at 23. 
24. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. 
25.ld. 
26. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
27. At the appellate court level the indecency provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 seemed 
to have no independent vitality since Carlin's monologue was not obscene and the obscen-
ity provision subsumed indecency. The Court of Appeals skirted addressing one of the key 
issues in the FCC decision: what is indecent speech? The court wrote: "It is evident 
therefore that the term indecent has never been authoritatively construed by the courts 
in connection with Section 1464. Since we feel section 326 of the Communications Act is 
dispositive of this appeal we do not find it necessary to resolve this difficult question." 
556 F.2d at 15. 
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artistic, political or scientific value," two of the criteria set forth 
in Miller. 28 
The obvious intent of the CBS advertisement was to appeal 
to prurient interests. The copy of the advertisement stressed the 
idea that the "Lifeguard" movie would show the viewer the inside 
story of the private life of a lifeguard. Superimposed upon this 
copy were visual images of large-breasted, bikini-clad females. 
The advertisement promised the viewer that the movie would 
focus on the spectacle of such women and how the leading male 
character sexually conquered them.29 
Providing viewers with "T and A" (industry slang for "tits 
and ass") is an acknowledged and publicized purpose of some 
network programming for the 1978-1979 season. In order to fore-
stall any conclusion by the Commission that hyperbole, fantasy 
or hysteria underlies my claim that the networks have under-
taken a conscious design to appeal to prurient interests, I quote 
at some length excerpts from the 60 Minute broadcast of Septem-
ber 17, 1978, called "The Rating Game":30 
Mike Wallace: Of all the games played in televi-
sion, the one that's played for the highest stakes 
is the rating game. Tonight, the story of how that 
game is played. We won't be talking about news 
or specials. We won't be talking about "Roots" or 
"Holocaust." We're dealing only with prime-time 
entertainment series. 
[ABC's promotion: "We're Number One"] 
And if there's any single phenomenon that has 
tilted the rating books in ABC's direction, as here 
on the set of "Love Boat," it's "T and A." "T and 
A" is show biz talk for bosoms and but-
tocks-attractive young women in various stages 
of undress. Freddie Silverman helped build his 
ABC empire on the shoulders of these young 
women. 
Herb Jacobs is a veteran handicapper of new sea-
sons and new shows. At the CBS affiliates' meet-
28. ld. at 24. 
29. The advertisement promised, in this writer's opinion, other than what the movie 
delivered. 
30. Copyright CBS Inc. 1978, all rights reserved. Originally broadcast Sept. 17, 1978 
over the CBS Television Network as part of the "60 Minutes" program series. 
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ing, he explained to us how these "T and A" shows 
are concocted. 
Herb Jacobs: And they take their clothes off 
three times, they get ideas. Let's put them in a 
big, you know, sunbathing or-or surf bathing, 
and then they want them to run two or three times 
so they jiggle. And all are well-endowed, of course. 
And then they say, now, let's get three undressed 
scenes and three jiggles and write a script around 
it. 
Wallace: Bud Grant is CBS Vice President for 
Programs. 
Bud Grant: We think we have a Nielsen winner 
in "The American Girls." 
[Excerpt from "The American Girls" promotion] 
Wallace: They work for a TV magazine, in ba-
thing suits at least part of the time. The pilot for 
"American Girls" involved the investigation of a 
white slave ring in which the sexual favors of teen-
agers were auctioned off to a group of rich and 
dirty old men. The producers of "American Girls" 
tell us that this pilot is not necessarily typical of 
what you'll be seeing on the series. 
[Excerpt from "American Girls" promotional 
spot, asking viewers to "turn us on"] 
Grant: Don't be surprised if Rebecca and Amy 
sink "The Love Boat." 
Wallace: "The Love Boat" will be on ABC again 
this fall opposite "American Girls." Now there are 
some who will tell you that "T and A" has peaked 
and is on its way out. But ABC has a new one to 
go along with shows like "Three's Company." 
[Excerpt from "Three's Company"] 
And CBS has added two such entries to its sched-
ule: 
[Excerpt from "Flying High"] 
Who watches "T and A"? Apparently everybody. 
Of course, it's no surprise that men admire it. And 
when public pressure deprived them of some of 
the violent shows they used to watch, "T and A" 
was brought in by the networks to keep men in 
front of the tube. But the demographic statistics 
that the network researchers like to boast of show 
Women's Law Forum 
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that the most desirable audience of all is female, 
between the ages of 18 and 49. Why? Because 
they're the ones who control the pocketbook, who 
buy the products these shows advertise. And re-
search apparently proves that women, not just 
leering men, like "T and A". But not this woman. 
Lila Garrett is a television writer, producer and 
director. She turned down $120,000 to write for 
that CBS show called "American Girls." 
Lila Garrett: Well, I had an attack of the most 
dangerous disease on television: I had a moment 
of good taste. [Laughs] Television has turned 
into a locker room joke and sex has turned into 
graffiti. It's kind of a dirty thing that you write on 
walls. When I say women have become pin-ups in 
these shows, I'm really putting it rather mildly. 
Wallace: It's not just "T and A". It's comic book. 
625 
Such "T and A," as was evident in the "Lifeguard" ads, is 
designed to appeal to the prurient interests of male viewers. One 
need only review any copy of a so-called "girlie" magazine to 
know that focusing on the exposure of large female breasts and 
rounded buttocks is one of the key appeals to such prurient inter-
ests. This focus falls into the Supreme Court's definition of pru-
rient, as the Court explained it in reliance upon Webster's dic-
tionary: "material having a tendency to excite lustful 
thoughts."31 In "girlie" magazines the appeal is made not neces-
sarily through total nudity, but rather through the size of the 
breast, the sexualized setting of the photo, and the emphasis on 
the breast through photographic composition. Whereas total nud-
ity of the breasts may be a common element in appealing to 
prurient interests, it is not an indispensable one. I suggest that if 
it were thought of as indispensable, the broadcast industry would 
not fmd it profitable to attempt to program "T and A." 
A defmitive answer to the question of whether the average 
person applying contemporary community standards would fmd 
that an on-the-air display of "tits" appeals to prurient interests 
is most difficult. I posit that the average person has a very ambi-
valent attitude toward a display of the female breast because that 
which he or she knows should be seen as natural, functional and 
desexualized-the breast-has been insidiously twisted by a male 
31. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957). 
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society to become a symbol or lust. Probably the most objective 
of social analysts would express this ambivalence when asked to 
comment on the positive or negative effect of "mammary wor-
ship." Because of what amounts to almost a social mystique sur-
rounding the female breast-it has become the symbol of natural 
woman and fantasy sex-probably most people would be reluc-
tant to say that the CBS depiction either appeals to prurient 
interests or is patently offensive. 
I think the existence of "girlie" magazines coupled with the 
broadcast industry's avowed purpose of presenting "T and A" to 
increase ratings serves as proof positive that the focus on breasts 
on television is designed to appeal to the prurient interests of a 
significant segment of the adult viewing public. 
As to a second Miller criterion, it is obvious that CBS' ad 
taken as a whole lackeq "serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value."32 CBS in this ad was engaging in commercial 
speech, designed to attract an audience for a specific program. 
The advertisements in no way suggested independent artistic or 
literary values. 
Thus, whereas the CBS clip appealed to prurient interests 
and the WBAI broadcast did not, and whereas the CBS advertise-
ment was shown for commercial purposes only and lacked any of 
the literary and artistic values present in the linguistic ironies of 
the Carlin monologue,33 the CBS showing can be said to have 
been closer to obscenity than was the WBAI broadcast. 
The remaining (and in many ways most challenging) issue 
then becomes: can it be said of the CBS broadcast what the 
Supreme Court said of the WBAI broadcast, that it was "'vulgar,' 
'offensive,' and 'shocking"'?34 One may ask in more constitutional 
32. 413 U.S. at 24. 
33. The WBAI decision alluded to such an artistic or literary value when it suggested 
that "during the late evening hours such words conceivably might be broadcast, with 
sufficient warning to un consenting adults provided the programs in which they are used 
have serious literary •.. value." 56 F.C.C.2d at 100. Because the Commission precluded 
any in-depth consideration of such merits by stating that such values cannot redeem a 
patently offensive work if children are listening, authority for my statement that there is 
literary value in Carlin's "linguistic ironies" must be supplied by the reader's judgment. 
34. 438 U.S. at 747. In many ways the Supreme Court's closely divided opinion 
raises more questions than it answers. B_ut on one issue five justices are clear: the 
Communication Act's § 326 prohibitions operate only after Title 18 § 1464's powers 
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terms whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct.3s Even if the answer to this were a 
proven and emphatic "it does not," I suggest that this answer 
would not preclude your making a determination as to whether 
the broadcast was indecent. 
As the Supreme Court has indicated by its affirmation of the 
Commission's WBAI decision, not all Miller elements have to be 
proven before the Commission may apply statutory38 sanctions for 
indecent language. Second, what is patently offensive must be 
measured by the key considerations spelled out in WBAI: does 
the depiction reduce human beings to their sexual or excretory 
functions and are children being exposed to this imagery?37 
What the Commission found as patently offensive in Carlin's 
monologue was not necessarily a description of sexual conduct,38 
but rather that the language had the "effect of debasing and 
brutalizing human beings by reducing them .... "39 In this in-
stance the reduction was of woman to a depersonalized sexual 
organ-the big "tit." Any counterargument that a breast is not 
have been accounted for. Further, the Supreme Court expressly ruled on a question 
shunned by the Court of Appeals: there is a distinction between obscene and indecent 
speech. 438 U.S. at 740-41. 
Using a definition of indecent that invites government hatchetwork, the Supreme 
Court wrote: "Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but the normal definition of 
'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." Id. at 
740. The Court then plugged the Commission's illustration of indecent into the Court's 
own banal description: indecent is "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual 
organs and activities." 438 U.S. at 743. 
The Court, instead of dealing with Judge Bazelon's contention that the Commission 
had no objective basis for concluding that Carlin's monologue was patently offensive, 
summarily authorized the Commission's conclusion. "In this case it is undisputed that 
the content of the Pacifica broadcast was 'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shocking'." Id. at 747. 
35. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 11>, 24 (1973). Technically, Miller speaks to words 
which depict sexual conduct. Depiction of the female breast mayor may not be sexual 
conduct, depending upon the manner and context of depiction. Certainly, a large-breasted 
female bent at the waist to accentuate the breasts and winking straight on into a camera 
is a picture depicting sexual conduct. 
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 
37. 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. 
38. Miller, in guiding a jury's obscenity determination, advises the juror to look to 
state law for specific definition of sexual conduct. This Miller element was never discussed 
in the Commission's decision. It seems to have fallen by the wayside in the decision's 
summary dismissal of its need to show "appeal to prurient interests." The Commission's 
repeated reference to "sexual organ" became a substitution for "sexual conduct." To the 
extent that CBS sexualized the breast, the depiction was of a "sexual organ." 
39. 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. 
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patently offensive because it is a natural and beautiful bodily 
attribute has no more meaning than if it had been argued that 
Carlin merely spoke of "copulation," which is a natural and beau-
tiful act. 
The Commission's WBAI decision was based, in large mea-
sure, upon the fact that the broadcast was made at a time when 
children were likely to be in the audience.4o I ask that this condi-
tion prevail as you review my claim against CBS. I also ask that 
you consider the additional seriousness of the effect on children 
when the indecency is in the form of a picture rather than a word. 
Given the concreteness of a picture compared to the abstractness 
of a spoken word, it becomes obvious that an indecent picture has 
the greater potential for an adverse effect upon a child. 
Multiple studies have explored the influence of language and 
visual imagery in the formation of values and attitudes in chil-
dren.41 It must follow that seeing women depicted as "tits" will 
play an important part in a child's formation of role models. "The 
ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast mate-
rial, coupled with concerns recognized in Ginsberg [v. New 
York], amply justify special treatment,-,of indecent broadcast-
ing."42 
I raise one further point for your consideration in urging you 
not to reject this claim as contrary to the mandate of the statute 
addressing a broadcaster's right of uninterrupted free speech.43 
Obviously, by the terms of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Pacifica, inter alia, this right is not unlimited and certainly can-
not be said to be any greater than free speech rights under the 
first amendment. Thus, whatever considerations apply to 80-
called "commercial speech" under the first amendment, should 
also apply to the broadcast of commercials on television. 
40. Id. at 99. 
41. See 4 REpORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL, TELEVISION AND GROWING Up: THE IMPACT 
OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE (1970); Clinton, TV as a Behavior Model: Results of Research, 11 
AM. EDUC. 40 (1975); Goffman, Genderism: Reinforcement of Sex Role Stereotypes by 
Advertising, 11 PSYCH. TODAY 6 (1977); Schneider & Hacker, Sex Role Imagery and Use 
of the Generic 'Man' in Introductory Texts, 8 AM. Soc. 12 (1973). 
42. 438 U.S. at 750. In the Commission's words: "It seems to us that the use of 
television to further the educational and cultural development of children bears a direct 
relationship to the licensee's obligation .•. to operate in the public interest." Petition 
of Action for Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974). 
43. 47 U.S.C. § 326. For text of § 326, see note 7 supra. 
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Although the Supreme Court has indicated that commercial 
speech is not exempted from first amendment protection, "[a] 
different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow 
of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unim-
paired. "44 The informational value of the CBS ads was virtually 
nil; the potential spectacle promised by the advertisement never 
materialized. I cannot recall seeing those same large-breasted 
females in the motion picture who appeared in the ads, and even 
if they were fleetingly present in the motion picture, the redistri-
bution of emphasis between ad and movie made the advertise-
ment misleading. 
However, even absent the element of "misleading," the CBS 
advertisements should not enjoy full protection under the Com-
munications Act of 1934,45 because they did not "serve the public 
interest, convenience and necessity."46 To the extent that CBS 
sold a program of voluptuous female semi-nudity it simply pan-
dered to eroticism. The ad was the equivalent of a "girlie" maga-
zine cover. The Supreme Court placed the worth of Carlin's mon-
ologue at "the periphery" of first amendment concerns.47 Given 
the scarcity of "spectrum space," CBS' advertisement should be 
at the periphery of Communications Act concerns. 
To inform the Commission of the reduced degree of protec-
tion that should be afforded commercials on television, I direct 
it to an excellent article, one of whose key tenets I heartily en-
dorse: "in the context of television product advertising [the 
"Lifeguard" program being the product], the interest which 
broadcasters, consumers, and advertisers might have in the free 
flow of demeaning images of women is not sufficient to outweigh 
the government's interest in regulating those images. "48 
I lack knowledge or foresight to suggest the appropriate sanc-
tions to be leveled against CBS,49 although it is obvious that I 
44. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.6 (1976). 
See Note, Ring Around the Collar-Chain Around Her Neck: A Proposal to Monitor Sex 
Role Stereotyping in Television Advertising, 28 HAsTINGS L.J. 149 (1976), where the author 
does an able job of demonstrating that "the special nature ofthe forum in which television 
product advertising occurs makes it particularly susceptible to regulation despite the 
protection of the first amendment." [d. at 163. 
45. 47 U.S.C. § 326. For text of § 326, see note 7 supra. 
46. 47 U.S.C. § 302; 438 U.S. at 748. 
47. [d. at 743. 
48. Note, supra note 43, at 164. 
49. One possible sanction that could result from this letter is simply a warning from 
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believe its advertisement for "Lifeguard" should be sanctioned. 
Nonetheless, one of my overriding interests in this complaint is 
eliciting from the Commission an answer to this question: "Tits! 
If you can't say it on the air, why can you show it?"5o 
Sincerely, 
Wendy P. Rouder 
the FCC that unless television advertisement shuns such over-emphasis of anatomy the 
stations displaying it will face license renewal jeopardy. Such an FCC result may be 
accomplished without rule-making as was the case in Petition of Action for Children's 
Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974). The FCC (pursuant to the authority conferred on it by 
47 U.S.C. § 312(a» could take the drastic step of revoking a license for an 18 U.S.C. § 
1464 violation. Less radical sanctions might be the issuance of a cease and desist order 
under 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) or assessment of a fine under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(E). In WBAl, 
the censure came in the form of a declaratory order that Carlin's monologue as broadcast 
constituted a violation of § 1464. The Commission alluded to more stringent sanctions if 
there were future complaints regarding comparable broadcasts. The Commission wrote: 
No sanctions will be imposed in connection with this contro-
versy, which has been utilized to 'clarify the applicable stan-
dards. However, this order will be associated with the station's 
license file, and in the event that subsequent complaints are 
received, the Commission will then decide whether it should 
utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by 
Congress. 
[d. At least one commentator has noted that any challenge to a station's license renewal 
creates a costly burden for the station. Such a challenge, in turn, tends to encourage self-
regulation by broadcasters. Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the 
First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1527 (1975). 
50. On Dec. 20, 1978, the FCC responded as follows: 
Dear Ms. Rouder: 
Because we receive so many questions and comments about 
broadcasting, we reduce expenses by using prepared responses. 
We believe that taxpayers will appreciate the economy. If the 
enclosed material does not adequately set out FCC policies of 
interest to you, and if you will specify the additional informa-
tion you need, we will try to provide a fuller explanation. 
(Signature) 
A postscript stated: "It does not appear that the material referred to in your Dec. 4, 1978 
letter is violative of the standards set forth in the enclosed publication. • . .n Enclosed 
was an analysis of Pacifica, as well as Pub. 8310-50, which is a form explanation of FCC 
criteria for indecency and obscenity. Nothing in Pub. 8310-50 contradicts the reasoning 
in the writer's letter. 
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